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This paper analyzes the effect of a potential reform to the Social Security system on 
individuals’ retirement and consumption choices. We first estimate the coefficients for a 
life—cycle model. We assume intratemporally nonseparable preference orderings and 
endogenous retirement. Our framework allows the possibility of disability. The 
specification predicts a change in consumption at retirement; we use the empirical 
magnitude of the change, together with desired retirement age, to identify key parameters 
such as the curvature of the utility function. We then qualitatively and quantitatively 
study the possible long—run effect of a Social Security reform in which individuals no 
longer face the OASI payroll tax after some specified age, and their subsequent earnings 
have no bearing on their Social Security benefits. Simulations indicate that retirement 
ages would rise by as much as one year, equivalent variations could average $5000 (1984 
dollars) per household or more, and reform could generate $2500 or more additional 








Osamu Aruga and Lina Walker provided excellent research assistance with the CEX and 
HRS data sets, respectively. We are grateful to David Blau, John Bound, Miles Kimball, 
Jeff Liebman, Richard Rogerson, Matthew Shapiro and participants at seminars at the 
American Economic Association meetings 2006, Arizona State, UCLA, University of 
Minnesota, New York University, University of Michigan, Osaka University, SITE 
(Stanford), University of Texas, University of Tokoyo, and Yale. This work was 
supported by a grant from the Social Security Administration through the Michigan 
Retirement Research Center (Grant # 10-P-98358-5). The opinions and conclusions are 
solely those of the authors and should not be considered as representing the opinions or 
policy of the Social Security Administration or any agency of the Federal Government. 
 
 1. Introduction
Many of the proposed reforms of the US Social Security system that have recently
received serious public airing do not focus on the potentially serious ineﬃciencies that the
existing system creates. This paper takes a diﬀerent course: it proposes and analyzes a re-
form that can address concerns about labor—supply distortions under the current program.
T h er e f o r mi ss i m p l ea n dr e v e n u en e u t r a l( f o rt h eS o c i a lS e c u r i t ys y s t e m ) :a f t e ral o n g
vesting period (say, 35-40 years of contributions), SSA would determine a worker’s beneﬁts
using the current formula for all prospective retirement ages; after the vesting period, the
worker would no longer face the Old Age Insurance payroll tax, and the worker’s beneﬁts
would cease to vary with his or her actions. Individuals who continued to work after vest-
ing would, in partial equilibrium, receive a 10.6 percent boost to their pay. Lost revenues
to the system would be made up by a small increase in the payroll tax during the vesting
period. Following the tradition of Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ [1987], we evaluate the eﬀects of
this reform with a standard life-cycle model. I nc o n t r a s tt ot h et r a d i t i o n ,w ee s t i m a t et h e
parameters of our model using in t e g r a t e dm i c r od a t aa n dan o v e le s t i m a t i o ns t r a t e g y .T h e
new strategy oﬀers quite precise estimates of key parameters, allowing us to simulate the
eﬀects of the reform with considerable statistical conﬁdence. We ﬁnd that the proposed
reform could have substantial eﬀects on both behavior and welfare. Simulations indicate
that retirement ages would rise by nearly a year on average and equivalent variations from
the reform may average $5,000 per household (1984 dollars) or more. When we account
for welfare gains to society, which include additional income taxes from longer careers, this
number increases to $7500 per household.
The logic of our proposed reform emerges directly when the structure the current
Social Security system is integrated with a life—cycle model (e.g., Diamond [1965], To-
bin [1967], Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ [1987], Modigliani [1986], Hubbard et al. [1995], Altig
et al. [2001], and many others) in which jobs require full-time work and the retirement
decision is irreversible. Under the current system, for those with substantial earnings his-
tories, the present value of Social Security beneﬁt sd o e sn o tm u c hd e p e n do nm a r g i n a l
earnings. Thus beneﬁts are, for many, eﬀectively lump sum and, given the low internal
rate of return in the system, the tax-beneﬁt structure generates an “income eﬀect” that
leads, on average, toward later retirement. We view this income eﬀect, due to the legacy
costs of the system, as unavoidable. The payroll tax also has, however, a substitution eﬀect
on labor supply. The tax lowers the marginal return to work, thereby tending to induce
earlier retirement. In a model where the timing of retirement is the principal margin for
labor supply, by doing away with the tax late in careers (but before optimal retirement),
we eliminate the substitution eﬀect and, therefore, the eﬀective eﬃciency—threatening dis-
tortion of the Social Security system.
2To quantify the life—cycle eﬀects of this reform, we develop a model with discrete,
endogenous labor supply, where jobs require full-time work and retirement is permanent.
The beneﬁt to a household of later retirement is greater lifetime earnings; the cost is
forgone leisure. As in Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ [1987], a household derives a ﬂow of services
from its consumption expenditure and leisure. The service ﬂow, in turn, yields utility
through a conventional isoelastic utility function. Although our “basic model” ignores
health considerations, we present a second formulation with a stochastic, but insurable,
chance of disability.
We estimate our life—cycle model’s parameters using pseudo—panel consumption data
from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) and lifetime earning and retirement data
from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS). We pursue what we believe is a novel
estimation strategy, ﬁrst outlined in Laitner and Silverman [2005]. The model predicts
a change in consumption expenditure at a household’s retirement, due to the abrupt
change in leisure and the intratemporal non—separability of consumption and leisure in
the preference ordering. A number of recent empirical studies have described a drop in
household consumption expenditure at the time of retirement (e.g., Banks et al. [1998],
Bernheim et al. [2001], Hurd and Rohwedder [2003], Haider and Stephens [2004], Aguiar
and Hurst [2004], and others). We use the magnitude of the drop, which this paper mea-
s u r e sf r o mC E Xd a t a ,a sw e l la sa g eo fr e t i rement, which we measure from the HRS, to
identify our key parameters.
Our analysis predicts that discontinuing the Social Security payroll tax after a vesting
period of 34 years of contributions could lead households to postpone their retirement
by nearly a year, on average. These results suggest that the social security system has
important eﬀects on the labor supply of older Americans. The analysis also suggests that
the eﬃciency gains from our proposal are substantial. In particular, consumers, on average,
would pay approximately $5,000 in 1984 dollars for this reform. When we account for the
social gain derived from income taxes on longer careers, this number increases to $7500
per household. It is important to note that these gains do not, however, represent Pareto
improvements – for some of those who, absent the reform, would have retired before the
vesting age, the policy change results in a welfare loss.
Our plan is distinguished from many current proposals involving changes in the fund-
ing of the system or changes in the early or normal retirement ages in that it emphasizes
eﬃciency over direct solvency concerns.1 The plan would not directly remedy current sol-
1 Similar reforms have been proposed elsewhere, both in an earlier version of this paper
(ASSA annual meeting [2006]), and in work by others (Shah et al. [2006], Burtless and
Quinn [2002]). Our work is, as far as we know, the ﬁrst to evaluate the eﬀects of this
reform with an estimated life—cycle model.
3vency problems of the Social Security System, but our proposed reforms could mitigate
ineﬃciencies from tax distortions to private labor supply decisions. And, longer careers
would contribute to the nation’s income—tax base, could tend to raise GDP and GDP per
capita, and could augment households’ lifetime resources from earnings.
This paper joins a large literature aimed at evaluating the eﬀects of social security
systems on labor supply. See Feldstein and Liebman [2002] for a review. By applying
an explicit life—cycle model we diﬀer from much of this literature, which seeks reduced
form estimates. Implementing a structural model allows us, most importantly, to evaluate
the life cycle eﬀects of both the existing social security system and counterfactual reforms
on retirement and consumption. As noted above, this structural approach follows the
t r a d i t i o no fA u e r b a c ha n dK o t l i k o ﬀ [1987], but we depart from that tradition in that we
estimate the parameters of our model from an integrated set of micro data.
By estimating the parameters of a fully-speciﬁed model, our paper also joins a smaller
literature that provides structural estimates of life-cycle models of retirement (see, for
example, Gustman and Steinmeier [1986], Rust and Phelan [1997], Bound et al. [2005],
Blau [2005], French [2005], and van der Klaauw and Wolpin [2005]). Our paper is dis-
tinguished from this literature by its emphasis on a novel reform and by its use of life
cycle consumption data. Our paper also diﬀers from much of the recent work on structural
models of retirement in that it adopts a certainty equivalent framework. We abstract from
the eﬀects of uninsured uncertainty. This choice is motivated by an eﬀort to build a rich
but tractable model that permits analytic as well as numerical insights. In this respect
our paper attempts to bridge structural econometric and policy—oriented literatures. We
view this approach as a logical one for evaluating our speciﬁcr e f o r m .
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 describes our basic model and
its formulation with stochastic disability. Section 3 discusses our pseudo—panel data on
consumption expenditure, our HRS data on lifetime earnings and retirement ages, and
our parameter estimates. Section 4 qualitatively and quantitatively analyzes the Social
Security reform outlined above. Section 5 concludes.
2. Model
This section presents our basic model. Then it elaborates the framework to include
stochastic disability.
2.1 Basic Model. We have an overlapping generationsm o d e l . T h i sp a p e rr e s t r i c t si t s
analysis to couples. A household begins when its male reaches age S. He marries at age
S0 and has children k =1 ,...,K at age Sk. Males die at age TM; females at age TF.S e t
T ≡ max{T M ,T F}.
4A key feature of our model is intratemporally nonseparable preferences. A household’s
current utility depends on its current service ﬂow from market consumption and leisure
(e.g., Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ [1987]). This paper assumes the service ﬂow is a Cobb—
Douglas function of household consumption, c, and leisure,  , per capita:
f(c, ) ≡ [c]α · [ ]1−α , α ∈ (0,1).
For couples, the man and woman work full time until retirement and retire when the male
is age R. We normalize   = 1 post retirement; prior to retirement
  = ¯   ∈ (0, 1).
A household’s utility ﬂow is an isoelastic function of its service ﬂow:
[f(c, )]γ
γ
, γ < 1.
This paper’s treatment of life—cycle changes in family composition follows Tobin [1967].
For household i at age t deﬁne
χS(i,t) ≡
 
1, if age—t household includes a spouse,
0, otherwise.
If household i at age t has K “kids” of ages 0-17 deﬁne
χK(i,t) ≡ K.
The number of “equivalent adults” in the household when it is age t is
nit ≡ 1+χS(i,t) · ξS + χK(i,t) · ξK , (1)
where ξS and ξK are positive parameters. Economies of scale in household operation
and/or the public—good nature of household consumption might well leave ξS < 1a n d
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· nit · [
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nit
]α·γ , for t ∈ [R,T].
5In other words, ﬂow utility depends upon consumption per equivalent adult and leisure
per adult, weighted by number of equivalent adults. In general, the Tobin speciﬁcation
implies that, absent subjective discounting, a non—zero interest rate, or change in leisure,
cit/cjt = nit/njt.





e−ρ·t · u(cit)dt + ϕ
 
ai,Ri + Bi(Ri) · er·Ri ,R i
 
(3)
subject to: ˙ ait = r · ait + yit − cit ,
aiS =0,
where ρ is the subjective discount rate; the household’s adult male supplies eM
it “eﬀective
hours” in the labor market per hour of work time; the adult female supplies eF
it “eﬀective
hours;” the wage rate per eﬀective hour is w; the income—tax rate is τ; the Social Security
and Hospital Insurance tax rate is τss;h o u s e h o l dn e tw o r t hi sait; and,
yit ≡
 
(1 − ¯  ) · [eM
it + eF
it] · w · (1 − τ − τss), for Si ≤ t<R i,
0, otherwise.
“Eﬀective hours” change with age, reﬂecting an individual’s cumulative experience and
economywide technological progress. The function ϕ(.)i s
ϕ
 






e−ρ·t · v(cit)dt (4)
subject to: ˙ ait = r · ait − cit ,
aiRi = A + Bi(Ri) · er·Ri and aiT ≥ 0,
where the age—0 present value of capitalized Social Security, Medicare, and private deﬁned—
beneﬁtp e n s i o nb e n e ﬁts is Bi(Ri). A household takes r, w, τ, τss, eM
it , eF
it,a n dB(.)a s
given. Social Security beneﬁts only begin at age max{Ri , 62}; Medicare beneﬁts begin at
age 65. Social Security and private—pension beneﬁts depend upon retirement age. Social
Security beneﬁts are taxed at rate τ/2, private—pension beneﬁts at rate τ, and Medicare
beneﬁts are not taxed.
Although the criteria and asset constraints of (3)-(4) are only piecewise continuously
diﬀerentiable, conventional optimality conditions remain valid provided costate variables
have a continuous time paths – see Lemma 1 in the appendix.
6Our empirical analysis rests on two features of solutions to (3)-(4). The sign and
magnitude of changes in cit at retirement are the ﬁrst – recall the introduction to this
paper. We have
Proposition 1: Let household i choose to retire at age R = Ri. Suppose that disconti-
nuities in nit and labor supply at retirement make the criterion and right—hand side of the
asset equation discontinuous at monotone increasing ages tj, j =1 ,...,J.L e tt0 ≡ S = Si





1 − α · γ
, (5)
cit+ = Mij · cit− ,M ij ≡
nit+
nit−
,t = tj ,j=1 ,...,J, but t  = R, (6)
ciR+ = Mij · ciR− ,M ij ≡ [¯  ]
−
(1−α)·γ
1−α·γ ,t = tj = R. (7)
Letting Mi0 =1 , initial household consumption is
ciS = ψ(i,R i) ≡
  Ri













The result of greatest interest here is (7), which implies, and characterizes, a dis-
continuous change in consumption at retirement. The intuition is as follows. Inputs to a
bivariate neoclassical production function are complementary in the sense that more of one
raises the other’s marginal product. If u(.) were linear, a household would desire to raise
its consumption at retirement to take advantage of this complementarity. If u(.)d e p a r t s
from linearity, a second, competing force arises: a household desires to “smooth” its ser-
vice ﬂow intertemporally –inducing it to want to decrease cit upon the cessation of work
to oﬀset increases in leisure. Condition (7) shows that complementarity predominates for
γ ∈ (0, 1), but proclivities to smooth service ﬂows win out for γ < 0.
The second foundation of our empirical analysis is households’ choice of Ri. To develop
intuition on the choice, we have
Proposition 2: Given a solution to (3)-(4), at R = Ri ∈ (Si ,T) one has
 
α · [niR]1−α·γ · [ciR−]α·γ−1 · [¯  ](1−α)·γ 






[ciR+]α·γ − [ciR−]α·γ · [¯  ](1−α)·γ 
. (9)
7Proof: See Appendix.
The idea of (9) is as follows. The left—hand side registers the advantage of a marginal
increase in retirement age R: yiR− measures additional earnings contingent upon postpon-
ing retirement; ciR+ − ciR− registers the fact that if desired consumption declines after
retirement, earnings may stretch farther; and, B 
i(R)·er·R measures incremental pension—
beneﬁt gains. The left side of (9) multiplies the sum of these dollar advantages by the
marginal utility of consumption, converting to units of utility. The right—hand side of (9)
captures the disadvantage of postponing retirement, namely, the diﬀerence – which is
positive – between the ﬂow of utility after and before retirement.2
A second interpretation is also interesting. Divide both sides of (9) by [niR]1−α·γ ·
[ciR−]α·γ, and notice that ciR+/ciR− is a constant. Then the left side depends only on




while the right side is constant. If the left—hand part falls with age, retirement occurs
when the two sides become equal. Reductions in the growth rates of earnings and pension
accumulation in old age encourage retirement. Increases in consumption – provided the
latter’s growth rate from (5) is positive – do the same because higher consumption raises
the value of leisure. (In fact, we might surmise that diﬀerences in households’ lifetime
earnings and pension—accumulation patterns tend to promote heterogeneity of retirement
a g e s ,w h e r e a st h ec o m m o nl i f e t i m er a t eo fi ncrease in consumption (see (5)) promotes
homogeneity.)
2.2 Discussion. Two especially important features of our model are discrete labor supply
options and intratemporally non-separable preferences.





) · sgn([¯  ]
−(1−α)·γ·α·γ




) · sgn(1 − [¯  ]
(1−α)·γ






) · sgn(1 − [¯  ]
(1−α)·γ
1−α·γ ).
Recall that ¯   ∈ (0,1) and α ∈ (0,1). If γ ∈ (0,1), the sign of both terms in the last product
is positive. If γ < 0, each is negative.
8In our framework, households must either work full time or retire. While in practice
employers do oﬀer part—time jobs, the rate of pay may be lower than that for full—time
work, possibilities of advancement more limited, etc.3 As Rust and Phelan [1997] write,
The ﬁnding that most workers make discontinuous transitions from full—
time work to not working, and the ﬁnding that the majority of the relatively
small number of ‘gradual retirees’ reduce their annual hours of work by taking on
a sequence of lower wage partial retirement ‘bridge jobs’ rather than gradually
reducing hours of work at their full-time pre-retirement ‘career job’ suggests the
existence of explicit or implicit constraints on the individual’s choice of hours of
work. [p.786]
An indivisible work day seems consistent with the fact that U.S. data show little trend
in male work hours or participation rates after 1940, except for a trend toward earlier
retirement 1940-80 (e.g., Pencavel [1986], Blundell and MaCurdy [1999], and Burkhauser
et al. [1999]).
Although intratemporal additivity is perhaps the most common speciﬁcation for utility
in the life—cycle literature, such a formulation leaves any routine drop in consumption at
retirement unexplained. Our nonseparable speciﬁcation is similar to a number of papers
(e.g., Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ [1987], King et al. [1988], Hurd and Rohwedder [2003], and
Cooley and Prescott [1995]). Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ employ a CES aggregator for service
ﬂows, assuming an elasticity of substitution for f(.) of 0.75 in their “base case;” Cooley
and Prescott [1995], for example, use the same functional forms as we do. Deviating from
the Cobb—Douglas service—ﬂow function would complicate (5) and (7), exacerbating the
shortcomings of our consumption data. Lower substitution possibilities would, on the
other hand, have potentially interesting implications for retirement patterns in the long
run; hence, less restrictive speciﬁcations remain a topic for future research.
2.3 Disability. This section augments the basic model to include a stochastic chance of
disability. This paper considers only the case with actuarially fair insurance, it assumes
that exogenous factors cause disability, and it assumes that one’s health status is objec-
tively veriﬁable.
Assume that a household’s health status is either “not disabled” or “disabled,” and
that a disabled household can never again work. Once a household becomes disabled, it
remains disabled until it reaches its (previously) chosen retirement age R,a tw h i c hp o i n t
3 Reasons for the wage penalty for part-time work include daily ﬁxed costs of startup
and shutdown, scheduling and coordination problems, employer concern for timely re-
turn on training investments, and the ﬁxed—cost nature of some employee beneﬁts (e.g.,
Hurd [1996]).
9we reclassify it as retired. Let p(t) be the probability that a household becomes disabled
at age t.L e tP(s) be the probability of becoming disabled after age s:













At age t<R , a nondisabled household purchasing term disability insurance during
the interval [t,t+dt) would pay an insurance premium with annual rate p(t)·Xit/P(t)–
in other words, it would pay total premiums p(t) · Xit dt/P(t), to receive (current—dollar)
lump—sum beneﬁt Xit in the event of disability. Whether disabled or not, household i
receives capitalized sum Bi(Ri) · er·Ri, in current dollars, at its chosen retirement age
Ri; thus, retirement beneﬁts implicitly include a disability—insurance component in our
framework, and disability insurance need only tide a household over until its retirement
age.
Disabled households beneﬁt from full-time leisure; presumably disability lowers their
utility as well. Assume the latter implies an additively separable term in the ﬂow utility
function. Such a term does not aﬀect household behavior; so, for simplicity, our analysis
omits it.
Behavior after retirement is the same as before; hence, problem (4) remains as above.
If household i happens to become disabled at age D = Di <R i = R and has insurance
payout XiD, its cumulative utility for ages t ∈ [D,T]i s
¯ ϕ
 






e−ρ·t · v(¯ cit)dt + ϕ
 
¯ aiR− + Bi(R) · er·R ,R
 
(12)
subject to: ˙ ¯ ait = r · ¯ ait − ¯ cit ,
¯ aiD+ = A + XiD ,
¯ aiR ≥ 0.
We are now ready to set out a household’s complete life—cycle problem for the envi-














   R
S
e−ρ·t · u(cit)dt + ϕ
 
aiR+ + Bi(R) · er·R ,R
  
(13)
subject to: ˙ ait = r · ait + yit − cit −
p(t) · Xit
P(t)
for t ≤ D,R,
aiS =0.
The criterion’s ﬁrst term captures lifetime utility if the household becomes disabled at age
D<R ; the second component captures lifetime utility if the household reaches its chosen
retirement age R without ﬁrst becoming disabled.











p(D) · e−ρ·t · u(cit)dDdt =
  R
S
[P(t) − P(R)] · e−ρ·t · u(cit)dt,
where the middle step uses Fubini’s theorem. This enables us to rewrite the criterion as
  R
S
[P(t) · e−ρ·t · u(cit)+p(t) · ¯ ϕ(ait− + Xit,t,R)]dt+
P(R) · ϕ
 
aiR− + Bi(R) · er·R ,R
 
,
from which the new model’s analog to Proposition 1 follows:
Proposition 3: Consider the model with disability. Let household i choose to retire at
age R = Ri. Suppose that discontinuities in nit and labor supply at retirement or disability
make the criterion and right—hand side of the asset equation discontinuous at ages tj,










· cit− ,t = tj ,j =1 ,...,J, but t  = R, (15)
ciR+ =[ ¯  ]
−
(1−α)·γ
1−α·γ · ciR− . (16)
If the household becomes disabled at age D<R , we replace (16) with
ciD+ =[ ¯  ]
−
(1−α)·γ
1−α·γ · ciD− and ciR+ = ciR− . (17)
Let Mij be the consumption jump from (15)-(17) at tj, j =1 ,...,J,a n dl e tMi0 =1 .S i n c e
one breakpoint occurs at age min{D,R},w r i t etj = tj(D) when D<Rand tj = tj(R)
otherwise. Then the initial consumption of household i is
ciS = ¯ ψ(i,R) ≡
  R
S p(D) · [
  D
S e−r·t · yit dt]dD + P(R) ·
  R


































The new feature of Proposition 3 is the change in consumption upon pre-retirement
disability, namely, condition (17). The intuition for (17) is as follows. Although the
possibility of disability reduces lifetime resources (cf. (8) and (18)), households adopt
full insurance. The need to pay insurance premiums causes lifetime consumption to be
lower, but, with insurance, the actual onset of disability causes a household no further
ﬁnancial hardship. The latter fact implies that a household chooses the same consumption
change after becoming disabled as at the arrival of its planned retirement age in other
circumstances.
T h ea n a l o gt oP r o p o s i t i o n2p r o v i d e saﬁrst—order condition for each household’s
utility—maximizing retirement age:
Proposition 4: Given a solution to (4) and (12)-(13), at R = Ri ∈ (S,T) one has
12 
α · [niR]1−α·γ · [ciR−]α·γ−1 · [¯  ](1−α)·γ 
· [yR− − ciR− + ciR+ + B 








[ciR+]α·γ − [ciR−]α·γ · [¯  ](1−α)·γ 
(19)
when Ri ≤ Di. Furthermore,
XiR = yiR− − ciR− + ciR+ . (20)
Proof: See Appendix.
As in Proposition 2, (19) balances retirement—induced losses of wages and retirement
beneﬁts against utility gains from more leisure. What is new is that only earnings net of
disability—insurance cost constitute an advantage for postponing retirement.4
2.4 Estimation equations. This section derives the two equations on which our estimation
depends.
The ﬁrst equation comes from Proposition 3. When household i is age s,i th a s
experienced a set of ages, say, κ(s,i), with breakpoints from family composition changes
and retirement or disability. Let the consumption-level adjustment factors corresponding
to breakpoints be Mik as in Proposition 3. Then Proposition 3 shows that






Let Di be the household’s age of disability. Deﬁne
χRD(i,t) ≡
 
1, if t ≥ min{Ri ,D i},
0, otherwise.
Noting that κ(s,i) ⊆ κ(s +1,i ), and using (1), we then have
ln(ci,s+1) − ln(ci,s)=
r − ρ










1 − α · γ
+ ξS · [χS(i,s+1 )− χS(i,s)] + ξK · [χK(i,s+1 )− χK(i,s)]+
(1 − α) · γ · ln(¯  )
α · γ − 1
· [χRD(i,s+1 )− χRD(i,s)], (21)
4 This does not imply that the possibility of disability necessarily leads to earlier re-
tirement – the cost of insurance induces an income eﬀect, operating through ciR− in
(19).
13where the approximation comes from a ﬁr s t — o r d e rT a y l o rs e r i e s .
Consumption is very diﬃcult to measure in practice. Our consumption data, described
below, provides a pseudo panel of average consumption, ¯ cst, for households of age s at




ωist · cist .
Since the distribution of earnings in practice is roughly lognormal and our life—cycle prefer-
ences are homothetic, think of household consumption in each age—year cell as lognormally














Assuming σs+1,t+1 ≈ σst and letting υst register consumption measurement error, our ﬁrst
equation for estimation follows from (21) and the two preceding expressions:
ln(¯ cs+1,t+1) − ln(¯ cst)=
r − ρ
1 − α · γ
+ ξS · [
 
i
ωi,s+1,t+1 · χS(i,s+1,t+1 )−
 
j




ωi,s+1,t+1 · χK(i,s+1,t+1 )−
 
j
ωjst · χK(j,s,t )]+
(1 − α) · γ · ln(¯  )




ωi,s+1,t+1 · χRD(i,s+1,t+1 )−
 
j
ωjst · χRD(j,s,t )]+
υs+1,t+1 − υst . (22)
Our second estimation equation comes from the retirement—age choices of individual
households. Given the consumption path from Proposition 3, we maximize (12)-(13) with
respect to Ri. W eh a v eH R Sd a t a ,d e s c r i b e db e l o w ,o nt h el i f e t i m ee a r n i n g s ,r e t i r e m e n t
age, and demographics for individual households. Letting Ri be the actual retirement age
of household i and R∗
i be our model’s prediction, we estimate
Ri = R∗
i +  i , (23)
14where  i captures measurement error in retirement age; household mistakes; factors inde-
pendent of our model, such as a particular employer’s wishes; etc. Proposition 4 makes
no reference to second—order conditions; consequently, we generate R∗
i from a global max-
imization algorithm described below.
3. Data and Estimation
As the introduction previewed, this paper estimates (22) from CEX data and (23) from
the HRS. After discussing the data sources, this section presents our parameter estimates.
3.1 CEX Data. Our primary data source for estimating (22) is the U.S. Consumer Ex-
penditure Survey (CEX). It provides comprehensive consumption data. The CEX obtains
diary information on small purchases from one set of households; for a second set of house-
holds, it conducts quarterly interviews that catalog major purchases. The survey also
collects demographic data and data on the value of the respondent’s house. At any given
time, the sample consists of approximately 5,000 (7,000 after 1999) households, which each
remain in the survey for at most 5 quarters. The survey was conducted at multi—year in-
tervals prior to 1984, and annually thereafter. This paper uses the surveys for 1984-2001.5
Earlier drafts (Laitner and Silverman [2005]) of this work compared CEX annual
consumption totals with the National Income and Product Accounts. Assuming that the
NIPA numbers are accurate, that item—nonresponse and other measurement errors of the
survey typically make CEX totals too low, and that the relative magnitude of survey
errors does not systematically vary with age, for each year we scale CEX consumption
categories, uniformly across ages, to match NIPA amounts. Appendix II lists our categories
and describes in detail three additional adjustments concerning the treatment of housing
services, health care, and personal business expenditures. This paper abstracts from the
empirical diﬀerence between consumption and expenditure (e.g., Aguiar and Hurst [2004])
and, except in the case of housing, draws no distinction between consumer durable stocks
and ﬂows.
Deﬂating with the NIPA personal consumption deﬂator, and using survey weights, we
derive an adjusted average consumption amount, our ¯ cst, for each age s and year t.D u e
to the construction of the CEX from separate interview and diary surveys, and annual
aggregation from quarterly, rotating—sample data, we do not have consumption ﬁgures for
individual households. We organize the CEXd a t as ot h a tah o u s e h o l d ’ sa g ei st h ea g eo f
t h ew i f ef o ram a r r i e dc o u p l e( a n dt h es i ngle household head in other cases).
5 The web site http://stats.bls.gov.gov/csxhome.htm presents aggregative tables, code-
books, etc., for the CEX. This paper uses raw CEX data from the ICPSR archive, and
we gratefully acknowledge the assistance of the BLS in providing “stub ﬁles” of changing
category deﬁnitions.
15The CEX provides information on whether the household is married. Although the
CEX also reports number of children age 0-17, we construct our own measure of children
per household to gain more ﬂexibility: using Census data on births per woman at age
s ∈ {15,...,49} in year t ∈ {1920,...,2001}, we simulate the number of children of each age
for women of each age 1984,...,2001.
CEX data on retirement is unsatisfactory because the CEX questionnaire only asks
whether the respondent is “retired” when he or she had zero weeks of work in the prior
twelve months; therefore, we turn to the March Current Population Survey (CPS) 1984-
2001 for our χs(Ri)v a r i a b l e . 6 We consider a CPS household retired if the head is over 50
years old and answers that he or she is out of the labor force at the time of the March survey
for reasons other than unemployment or, in the case of a male, is not “unemployed” but
reports under 30 hours per week of work. This paper focuses on male retirement because
males were more attached to the labor force in the cohorts of our data and because our
analysis abstracts from a detailed model of decision making within dual—earner households.
3.2 Retirement Data. The HRS is our data source for estimating equation (23), though we
calibrate some parts of our life—cycle framework.
Consider the calibrations ﬁrst. We assume a constant gross—of—income tax real interest
rate of 5%/yr.7 We disregard government transfer payments other than Social Security.
Our income tax rate τ comes from government spending on goods and services less indirect
taxes (already removed from proﬁts, and implicitly absent from wages and salaries below).
Dividing by national income, the average over 1952—2003 is 14.28%/year.8
6 Indeed, the average median retirement age 1984-2001 in the CEX data is 64-65,
whereas it is about 62 in the CPS.
7 Our real interest rate comes from a ratio of factor payments to capital over the market
value of private net worth. For the numerator, NIPA Table 1.13 gives corporate business
income, indirect taxes, and total labor compensation. The ﬁrst less the other two is our
measure of corporate proﬁts; the ratio of proﬁts to proﬁts plus labor remuneration is
“proﬁts share.” We multiply the latter times corporate, noncorporate, and nonproﬁt—
institution income less indirect taxes. We add household—sector income (NIPA Table
1.13) less indirect taxes and labor remumeration. Finally, we subtract personal business
expenses (brokerage fees, etc. from NIPA Table 2.5.5, rows 61—64). The denominator
is U.S. Flow of Funds household and non—proﬁt institution net worth (Table B.100, row
19), less government liabilities (Table L106c, row 20). We average beginning and end
of year ﬁgures. For 1952—2003, the average is .0504. For comparison, Auerbach and
Kotlikoﬀ [1987] use 6.7%/year, Altig et al. [2001] 8.3%/yr., Cooley and Prescott [1995]
7.2%/yr., and Gokhale et al. [2001] use post—tax rates of 4%/yr. and 6%/yr.
8 Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ [1987], for example, use 15%/year.
16In the calculations below, the Social Security beneﬁt formula, including the ceiling on
taxable annual earnings, follows the history oft h eU . S .s y s t e m .O n e — h a l fo fS o c i a lS e c u r i t y
beneﬁts are subject to the income tax.
Our theoretical model assumes that adults work 40 hours per week until retirement
and 0 hours per week thereafter. With 16 × 7 waking hours per week, we set9
¯   =
16 × 7 − 40
16 × 7
= .6429.
Turning to the HRS data, we derive earnings proﬁl e sa n dr e t i r e m e n ta g e sf r o mt h e
original HRS survey cohort, consisting of households in which the respondent was age
51-61 in 1992. A majority of participant households signed a permission waiver allowing
the HRS to link to their Social Security Administration (SSA) earnings history. Each
history runs 1951-1991; our HRS survey data covers 1992, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, and
2002. We restrict attention to once—married couples with both spouses alive in 1992, with
the husband having linked SSA earnings and remaining in the labor force until at least
age 51, and with the wife having linked SSA data or reporting no market work prior to
1992. Men and women must have 8-24 years of education. They become adults at the
age equaling years of education plus 6, and we drop those reaching this age before 1951.
Men and women live independently until marriage. (We set our age of marriage at the
minimum of the reported age and age at ﬁrst birth.) We assume that men die at the close
of age 74 and women at the close of 80. We exclude couples with more than 10 years age
diﬀerence. Omitting households with incomplete data leaves 1095 couples.
As stated, we assume that a household retires when its male adult does. The HRS
twice asks if each adult is retired and when retirement took place. Prior to 1992, a male is
retired if he reports that status on either question. After 1992, a male who reports being
retired and works less than 1500 hours per year, or who works less than 1500 hours and
never again more than 1500 hours per year, is “retired.” We exclude households that pass
our criterion for retirement in one survey wave but fail to do so in a subsequent wave,
reducing our sample to 1032.
For men, we estimate a so—called earnings dynamics model of earnings, dividing the
total HRS sample into 4 education groups, and regressing log constant—dollar earnings on
a quartic in age and dummy variables for time. The regression error has an individual
eﬀect as well as a random term. The data is right censored at the Social Security tax cap
prior to 1980; at $125,000 for earnings 125,000-250,000, at $250,000 for earnings 250,000-
500,000, and at $500,000 for earnings 500,000+ for 1981-1991. Our likelihood function
9 See also Cooley and Prescott [1995] – who, on the basis of time—use studies, determine
that households devote 1/3 of waking hours to work.
17takes the censoring into account. Laitner and Silverman [2005] presents more details.
After 1991, survey data is available every other year. As a protection against coding errors,
we exclude survey earnings greater than twice, or less than half, the earnings dynamics
equation prediction for the same age. This papera s s e s s e sl a t e — i n — l i f ee a r n i n g sa sf o l l o w s .
Using quadratic programming, we ﬁt a convex quadratic function to each male’s available
earnings ﬁgures from 1986 onward, constraining the function to match 1986 earnings and
have a non—positive slope at the last available work age. We interpolate missing data and
extrapolate prospective earnings through age 69. (Although in our model a household has
zero earnings after its male retires, our global maximization algorithm for R∗ –s e eb e l o w
– utilizes the extrapolated ﬁgures.)
Although we use similar steps for female earnings, there are several diﬀerences. A
woman who never works remains in our sample. As stated above, we assume a woman
retires when her spouse does. We extrapolate non—zero late—in—life earnings only for women
who supply market hours in the survey in the last year that their husband works. We are
much more concerned than for men that women might have part—time earnings. Prior to
1992, therefore, a woman’s earnings are her SSA earnings unless the latter are censored,
i nw h i c hc a s ew ei m p u t ef r o mo u rf e m a l ee a r n ings dynamics equations. The HRS provides
information in 1996 on whether a woman had non—FICA earnings prior to 1992 (i.e.,
earnings not covered in the Social Security system). If a woman had non—FICA jobs and
provided beginning and end dates, we impute her earnings from our earnings—dynamics
regressions; if she provided only the span of non—FICA employment, we subtract non—
FICA employment years 1980-91, which are evident from the data, and probabilistically
impute remaining years using our earnings—dynamics regressions; if a woman had non—
FICA employment but provided no information on when or how long, we drop the couple
from the sample on the basis of incomplete data.
Since HRS earnings are net of employer beneﬁts (including health insurance, pension
contributions, and employer Social Security tax), we multiply household earnings for each
year by the ratio of NIPA total compensation to NIPA wages and salaries.
We derive Social Security beneﬁts after retirement from the statutory beneﬁtf o r m u l a
for 2000. We also incorporate a stream of Medicare beneﬁts after age 65, less participant
SMI cost. To do this, for each adult 65 and older, we add to household resources Medicare
beneﬁts equaling the SMI annual premium for 2000 (i.e., $546) multiplied by the ratio of
HI and SMI total expenditures to SMI premiums for 2000 (i.e., 10.7282 less 1).
This paper considers two possible measures of disability. In a sequence of questions
about work status, the HRS asks respondents whether they are disabled and, if so, the year
of onset. Table 1, column 1, presents the cumulative (with HRS household weights) fraction
of men who characterize themselves in this way as disabled and are retired. As stated above,
18our sample is limited to men who retire after age 50. In terms of Section 2, the cumulative
probability corresponds to 1 − P(t) for each age t. Column 2 considers a less stringent
measure. In a sequence of questions about health status, the HRS queries respondents
on whether they have any health problems that “limit their ability to perform work.”
Column 2 presents cumulative fractions of men who are retired and who characterize
themselves as disabled or who say they have a work—limiting health condition.
Table 1. Cumulative Probability of Male Disability: HRS Data 1992-2002
Retired and Retired and Retired and Retired and
Age Disabled Disabled or Age Disabled Disabled or
Work-Limitation Work-Limitation
51 .0008 .0027 61 .0743 .1701
52 .0016 .0036 62 .0935 .2334
53 .0106 .0162 63 .1164 .3132
54 .0140 .0235 64 .1339 .3604
55 .0198 .0373 65 .1532 .4175
56 .0249 .0511 66 .1720 .4726
57 .0326 .0662 67 .2032 .5422
58 .0489 .0907 68 .2370 .6004
59 .0545 .1088 69 .2969 .6980
60 .0640 .1355 70 .3619 .7829
Source: see text.
Tables 2-3 present summary statistics on other aspects of our HRS sample. Table 2
calculates the present value at age 50 of after—tax lifetime earnings (1984 dollars) for men,
YM50, and women, YF50. (In these ﬁgures, earnings end at retirement or the respondent’s
last survey wave.) We can see that in this cohort, females’ earnings average only 20 percent
of males’. Table 2 also computes the present value of household Social Security beneﬁts at
male age 50. Table 3 warns that many men do not reach retirement age in our sample.
3.3 Estimation. Our estimation uses a method of moments approach. Letting   β be the
vector of parameters to be estimated, rewrite (22)-(23) as
q1
st(  β)=υs+1,t+1 − υst , (24)
q2
i (  β)= i . (25)
19Table 2. Statistics for HRS Sample
Variable Mean Minimum Median Maximum Coef.
Var.
Age Male Last
Works in Sample 61.3043 55 61 69 .0533
Age Diﬀ.C o u p l e :
Male Age - Female 2.9729 -8 3 10 .9802
Male Age Marriage 24.2921 14 23 56 .1770
Children per Couple 2.8165 0 3 10 .5402
YM50 1,581,000 508,000 1,417,000 12,278,000 .5843
YF50 312,000 0 240,000 2,437,000 .9921
B50 94,000 54,000 93,000 144,000 .1499
Source: see text. HRS household weights. Note: ages integer variables this paper.
Table 3. HRS Couples by Male Retirement Status
Category Stringent Deﬁnition Disability Includes
Disability Work-Limitationsa
Retired/not disabled 636 443
Never retires in sample 288 280
Retires after disability 74 197
Dies prior to retirement 34 33
Total sample 1032 953
Source: see text. (a) Omits non-respondents work-limitations question.
Assume that the υst and  i random variables are iid and mean 0. Standard steps yield a
matrix A diagonalizing the covariance matrix for (24):
q1∗
st (  β) ≡ A · q1
st(  β)=Υst (26)
with Υst i i da n dm e a n0 .L e t
  β ≡ (α, γ , ρ, ξS , ξK , σΥ , σ ). (27)
Our moment conditions for (26) are10
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ωi,s+1,t+1 · χRD(i,s+1,t+1 )−
 
j
ωjst · χRD(j,s,t ).
Our estimation of (28) also includes year dummy variables for 1984-1999 – see below.
Turning to q2
i (  β)=Ri −R∗
i, for each household i we solve (12)-(13) for integer values
R ∈ {51,...,69}, setting the path of each household’s consumption as in Proposition 3;
we ﬁt a quadratic to lifetime utility at the integer with the highest utility and its two
closest neighbors; and, we determine R∗
i from the quadratic’s peak. In comparison to
Proposition 4, this procedure has the advantage of ensuring that suﬃciency conditions
hold.
To meet the censoring problems evident in Table 3, and including males who die before
stopping work, assume  i ∼ N(0, σ2
 ) and, letting φ(.,σ2
 ) be the normal density, deﬁne
q2∗
i (  β) ≡ E[ i |data,   β]=
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lowing vector of parameter composites from (26) with FGLS:
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  . (29)
Table 4 presents our estimates. Columns 1-2 use (28)-(29), with diﬀerent deﬁnitions of
disability. We call this our basic model. We employ pseudo—panel CEX data for s=30,...,80,
t=1984,...,2001; after diﬀerencing, this yields 850 observations. (Starting the CEX data at
very youthful ages introduces a selection problem because college graduates, for example,
only join the sample at age 22. With initial age 20, our estimates would change; for starting
ages 25-35, they are stable.) HRS sample sizes are as in Table 3.
Parameter estimates are similar in columns 1-2 – though σ seems noticeably larger in
column 2, perhaps suggesting that the stringent deﬁnition of disability is more consistent
with agents’ actual retirement behavior.
Columns 3-4 consider a substitute for (29). Column 1’s methodology has the advan-
tages of satisfying second—order conditions and allowing measurement error for Ri;i th a s
the liability of requiring extrapolations of households’ earning proﬁles past actual retire-
ment – see, for example, French [2005] – though, in fairness, such extrapolations are
necessary for the policy simulations of Section 4 in any case. Column 3-4’s alternative
has the opposite strengths and weaknesses. Deﬁne a replacement Q2
i(  β)f o rq2∗
i (  β)f r o m
the left—hand side of marginal condition (19) minus the right—hand side, evaluating the
diﬀerence at each household’s actual retirement age Ri.S e t Q2
i(  β)=ηi, and assume
ηi ∼ N(0, σ2
η). One can interpret ηi as an idiosyncratic (across households), additive
preference for leisure – i.e., substitute v(cit)+ηi in (2) for v(cit). Proposition 4 shows
that Q2
i(  β) = 0 at the desired retirement age in the absence of such heterogeneity. Obser-
vations from households that never retire in sample, that die before retiring, or that retire
with disabilities, provide upper bounds for ηi, which straightforwardly generate an analog
Q3
i(  β)t oq3∗
i (  β). Equation (28) remains as before.
F o r t u n a t e l y ,T a b l e4d o e sn o tp o i n tt oad i ﬃcult choice between columns 1-4; the pa-
rameter estimates are very similar. (Violations of second—order conditions do, nevertheless,
arise for a number of cases in columns 3-4.)
As stated, columns 1-4 incorporate time dummies in (28). In fact, aggregative distur-
bances might aﬀect households of diﬀerent ages diﬀerently. Instead of using time dummies,
therefore, columns 5-6 average consumption changes ln(¯ cs+t,t+1)−ln(¯ cst)a l lt to attenuate
the inﬂuence of such shocks. Because the number of consumption observations shrinks to
50, the standard errors rise; however, the point estimates change only very modestly.
Table 4’s estimates of γ vary from -.65 to -1.07; the estimates of α vary from .33
to .40; the estimates of ρ vary from 0.00 to 0.01. These correspond to estimates of an
22Table 4. Estimated Coeﬃcients Equations (28)-(29):a
Estimated Parameter (Std. Error/T Stat.)
Basic Model Alt. Estimation
(see text) Using Prop. 4
Par.b
Stringent Def. Broad Def. Stringent Def. Broad Def.
Male Disabilityc Male Disabilityc Male Disability Male Disability
α 0.3298 0.3641 0.3469 0.4032
(0.0051/64.3325) (0.0053/68.3170) (0.0054/63.8677) (0.0076/53.1299)
γ -0.8539 -0.9434 -.8963 -1.0717
(0.1836/-4.6515) (0.2122/-4.4459) (0.1981/-4.5252) (0.2681/-3.9978
ρ 0.0079 0.0062 0.0071 0.0038
(0.0029/2.7201) (0.0034/1.8403) (0.0032/2.2582) (0.0044/0.8752)
ξS 0.3979 0.3979 0.3979 0.3979
(0.0541/7.3486) (0.0541/7.3486) (0.0541/7.3486) (0.0541/7.3486)
ξC 0.1469 0.1469 0.1469 0.1469






α·γ -0.2816 -0.3435 -0.3109 -0.4322
(0.0603/-4.6687) (0.0426/17.4673) (0.0689/-4.5156) (0.1112/-3.8857)
r−ρ
1−α·γ 0.0273 0.0273 0.0273 0.0273
(0.0013/21.5044) (0.0013/21.5044) (0.0013/21.5044) (0.0013/21.5044)
(1−α)·γ·ln(¯  )
α·γ−1
-0.1973 -0.1973 -0.1973 -0.1973
(0.0334/-5.9147) (0.0334/-5.9147) (0.0334/-5.9147) (0.0334/-5.9147)
Observations Eq. (28)/Eq. (29):e
850/1032 850/953 850/1032 850/953
a. Year dummies 1984, 1985, ... , 1999 for eq. (28) not reported.
b. Note: column 1-4 estimates of ξS, ξC, and second and third “calculated
parameters” identical because of exact identiﬁcation – recall fn 13.
c. “Stringent case male disability” refers to table 2, column 1; “broad case” refers to table 2, column 2.
d. Standard error from so—called delta method ﬁr s tr o wb e l o w ;f r o mG L So n( 2 8 )n e x tt w or o w s( s e ef n1 3 ) .
e. For sample size changes, see text.Table 4 (cont). Estimated Coeﬃcients Equations (28)-(29):a




Stringent Def. Broad Def.























Observations Eq. (28)/Eq. (29):e
50/1032 50/953
a. Year dummies 1984, 1985, ... , 1999 for eq. (28) not reported.
b. Note: column 1-2 estimates of ξS, ξC, and second and third
“calculated parameters” identical because of exact identiﬁcation
–r e c a l lf n1 3 .
c. “Stringent case male disability” refers to table 2, column 1;
“broad case” refers to table 2, column 2.
d. Standard error from the so—called delta method ﬁrst row below;
from GLS on (28) next two rows (see fn 13).
e .F o rs a m p l es i z ec h a n g e s ,s e et e x t .intertemporal elasticity of substitution for services, 1/(1 − γ), of 0.48 to 0.61, and an IES
for pre—retirement consumption itself, 1/(1 − α · γ), of 0.70 to 0.83. All estimates of γ, α,
and α · γ in columns 1-4 are statistically diﬀerent from zero at the 5 percent signiﬁcance
level.
Our estimates of γ, α,a n dρ are similar to a number of calibrations in the liter-
ature. For example, Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ’s [1987] favorite calibration has γ = −3,
α (roughly) = .4, and ρ = .015; Altig et al. [2001] use γ = −3, α (roughly) = .5, and
ρ = .004; and, Cooley and Prescott [1995] set γ =0 ,α = .36, and ρ = .053.
Our results may also be compared with estimates that have identiﬁed the IES from
expected changes interest rates. Using aggregate consumption data Hall [1988], Cambell
and Mankiw [1989], and Patterson and Pesaran [1992], for example, estimate the IES for
consumption to be very nearly zero. Micro studies tend to estimate larger intertemporal
elasticities. Banks et al. [1998], for instance, estimate the average IES for consumption to
be approximately 0.5. In another example, Attanasio and Weber [1993] estimate an IES
for consumption of approximately 0.75 from micro data.11 Although our calculations rely
av e r yd i ﬀerent source of variation to estimate the IES, Table 4’s outcomes are similar to,
if on the larger end of, those obtained in micro studies from the change in consumption
growth with expected changes in interest rates.
Table 4’s second “calculated parameter” provides an estimate of the average lifetime
growth rate for households’ per capita consumption (see Prop. 3) of 2.5-2.7%/yr. This
suggests that between, say, ages 25 and 62, in the absence of retirement a household’s
consumption per equivalent adult rises by a factor of about 2.62. In Auerbach and Kot-
likoﬀ [1987] the corresponding factor is about 1.54; in Gokhale et al. [2001], it is 1.74; in
Tobin [1967], it is 13.33. For an inﬁnite—lived representative agent model (e.g., Cooley and
Prescott [1995]), the growth rate of consumption in a steady—state equilibrium would, of
c o u r s e ,m a t c ht h eg r o w t hr a t eo fG D P .
Our estimate of ξS suggests that the addition of a spouse raises household consumption
by 39-44 percent. This agrees fairly closely with the U.S. Social Security System’s award to
retired households of 50 percent extra beneﬁts for a spouse. It is consistent with substantial
returns to scale for larger households. Many papers in the literature implicitly set ξS =1 .0,
and Table 2 suggests that such calibrations may be misleading.
Estimates of our third “calculated parameter” suggests a 16-20 percent drop in con-
11 Barsky et al. [1997] use hypothetical questions to estimate an IES distribution for
their sample. They ﬁnd an average IES of 0.2, with less than 20% of respondents having
an IES greater than 0.3. Others who have attempted to estimate a distribution of in-
tertemporal elasticities of substitution ﬁnd evidence that the IES is increasing with wealth
(e.g., Blundell et al. [1994]).
23sumption at retirement. This is consistent with, though at the smaller end of, estimates in
Bernheim et al. [2001], Banks et al. [1998], Hurd and Rohwedder [2003], and the retirement
brochures cited in Laitner [2001].
Our estimate of ξC suggests an increase in household consumption of 13-15 percent
for each child age 0-22. Since two parents correspond to 1.4 “equivalent adults,” a child
adds about 20 percent as much as each parent. Mariger [1986] estimates that children
consume 30 percent as much as adults; Attanasio and Browning [1995, p. 1122] suggest
58 percent; Gokhale et al. [2001] assume 40 percent; most of the analysis in Auerbach and
Kotlikoﬀ [1987] implicitly weights children at zero; Tobin [1967] assumes teens consume
80 percent as much as adults, and minor children 60 percent. Our estimate would be
consistent with parents who spend a great deal on their children but reduce expenditures on
t h e m s e l v e sa tt h es a m et i m e–p e r h a p sv i c a r i o u s ly enjoying their children’s consumption.
4. Social Security Reform
This section investigates the consequences of Social Security reforms in which the OASI
tax, and beneﬁt adjustments based on new earnings, cease at a speciﬁc age or following
as p e c i ﬁc span of career years. Individuals who avoid disability could retire at any age;
however, those who continue working after the Social Security vesting age/period would
enjoy a 10.6 percent increase in their aftertax wage. (As with the present system, individ-
uals could start collecting Social Security beneﬁts at age 62 or later, with an actuarially
fair adjustment for postponed receipt.)
Table 5 presents simulation outcomes for diﬀerent reforms and diﬀerent parameter esti-
mates. The table compares behavior of our HRS couples under the existing Social Security
System to the same sample if it had lived its life under the speciﬁed reform. Our analysis
is not general equilibrium in nature – wages and interest rates are exogenous – nor does
this section study transitions after reforms announced in a household’s midlife. Because
we want to examine prospective reforms in an environment that is revenue neutral from
the standpoint of the Social Security System, each of the table’s simulations introduces a
constant adjustment to historical Social Security taxes that equates the sample—average
present value (at age 50) of Social Security taxes less beneﬁts before and after reform.12
In row 1 of Table 5, for example, under the reform, couples realize that their Social
Security vesting ends at age 54. Subsequent to male (female) age 54, aftertax male (female)
wages rise 10.6 percent. If we disregard disability—shock realizations, the reform lengthens
careers by 1.08 years on average. In practice, the onset of disability (or death) can limit
12 As this is an aggregative condition, the present value calculation employs the gross—
of—tax real interest rate.
24Table 5. Simulations with Vesting by Age or by Span of Career:
Estimated Parameters as in Table 4; 1984 Dollars (NIPA PCE Deﬂator)
Vesting Average Average Average Average Average Per
Age Change Change Equivalent [Equivalent Household
or Actual Desired Variation Variation ÷ Additional
Vesting Career Career (PV Age 50) Lifetime Income Tax
Span Years Years Earnings] Revenue
(Years) (PV Age 50)
Age Stringent Deﬁnition Disability; Vesting by Agea
54 0.9733 1.0832 6192.90 0.0030 2996.66
58 0.7920 0.8904 4375.64 0.0022 2340.89
62 0.4281 0.5174 2348.83 0.0012 1150.01
66 0.1803 0.2336 904.43 0.0005 451.09
Age Broad Deﬁnition Disability; Vesting by Ageb
54 0.9472 1.2661 7195.95 0.0036 2430.67
58 0.7736 1.0834 5438.54 0.0028 1902.54
62 0.4716 0.7231 3327.37 0.0018 1070.30
66 0.2141 0.3412 1422.17 0.0008 469.59
Span Stringent Deﬁnition Disability; Vesting by Career Spana
34 0.8743 0.9702 5170.61 0.0026 2725.23
38 0.7579 0.8543 4134.92 0.0023 2261.47
42 0.5046 0.5886 2506.85 0.0015 1299.64
46 0.2071 0.2578 933.02 0.0006 442.64
Span Broad Deﬁnition Disability; Vesting by Career Spanb
34 0.8006 1.0521 5847.23 0.0030 2058.27
38 0.7484 0.9974 4934.35 0.0028 1875.72
42 0.5131 0.7286 3206.71 0.0019 1172.27
46 0.2261 0.3608 1299.32 0.0009 449.21
a. Average lifetime earnings (PV age 50) $1,888,477.73. Cases 994. In contrast to Table 4,
we eliminate households retiring before age 52 or after 68 – allowing our
existing solution algorithm (see text) a minimum of two years of latitude for
post—reform retirement—age changes.
b. 918 cases (see preceding note). Average lifetime earnings (PV age 50) $1,884,319.51.one’s ability to beneﬁt. Taking that into account, the average actual change in career
length according to the simulation is 0.97 years. If we ask households ex ante how much
they would pay to participate in the reformed Social Security System, column 3 shows
they would oﬀer, on average, $6193 (in 1984 dollars, present value at male age 50), which
amounts to 0.3 percent of their aftertax earnings.
To understand Table 5’s results, consider Proposition 4. As in the discussion of
Table 4, let Q2
i(R) equal the left—hand side of (19) minus the right—hand side. As in our





i(R) is positive (negative), household i should retire later (earlier).
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. (30)
Under the current Social Security System, with the stringent deﬁnition of disability, average
retirement—age values for households in our sample who are not forced to retire early
because of disability or death are yR− ≈ $35000, cR− ≈ $40000, p(R)/P(R) ≈ 0.26, and
B (R) · er·R ≈ $1125. In other words, in terms of Social Security cumulative beneﬁts,
the advantage of working one more year is relatively small; thus, (30) shows that the
major determinants of retirement, on average, seem to be forgone earnings relative to
consumption together witht h ev a l u eo fl e i s u r e .
Turning to the impact of a reform, say, full vesting at age 54, there are four types of
household. (i) Some households are disabled. They are constrained. Following a reform
to Social Security, they cannot work longer. (ii) For a typical unconstrained couple who
would otherwise retire at R>54, subsequent to reform yR− rises about $3600 and B (R)·
er·R declines to 0. Thus, Proposition 4 shows that such a couple should choose to work
longer. Net of disability insurance, an extra year’s work yields about $2700. Table 4
shows consumption rises steadily with age. Each extra planned year’s work raises lifetime
resources and, hence, consumption, as well. With one additional year’s work, the rise in the
denominator of the right—hand term of (30) and the disappearance of the right—hand term
would oﬀset nearly all the gain in aftertax earnings from reform. In other words, we expect
25an increase in average career length of about one year. (iii) A couple who had previously
chosen to retire before age 54 would have no incentive on the margin to work longer after
reform. On the contrary, yR− for R<54 would fall from the (slight) increase in Social
Security taxes prior to age 54. cR− would fall too as lifetime resources diminish from the
tax increase. Nevertheless, because the Social Security beneﬁt component of household
resources remains ﬁxed, the drop in consumption will be less in percentage terms than the
drop in earnings. Thus, the left—hand term of (30) will fall, causing R∗ to fall (slightly).
(iv) Some couples who chose to retire before age 54 in the absence of reform might make
a non—marginal response to reform, choosing to work to age 54 and, in fact, beyond, to
take advantage of the new tax break. Couples in this category could show labor supply
increases of more, perhaps much more, than 1 year.
Chart 1 displays the simulated distribution of retirement—age changes for vesting at
a g e5 8 .O n ec a ns e ee v i d e n c eo fb ehavior from all four groups.
Table 5 shows that later vesting leads to smaller labor supply increases on average.
This is expected: if a reform vests later in life, groups (i) and (iii) expand. In fact, the
changes are substantial.
Turning to equivalent variations, we must remember than revenue neutrality demands
an increase in the Social Security tax following reform. For line 1 of Table 5, the requisite
tax increase is about 0.5 percent. Some households in group (i) and all in group (iii) pay
the higher tax over their entire work lives but receive no beneﬁtf r o mr e f o r m . S o ,t h e i r
equivalent variation can be quite negative. Groups (ii) and (iv), in contrast, can show
positive equivalent variations. To the extent that members of group (ii) originally choose
to work beyond age 54, they achieve redistributive gains at the expense of group (iii).
Eﬃciency gains, gathered through longer working lives, should add to the equivalent vari-
ations of groups (ii) and (iv). In our partial equilibrium framework, redistributive gains
and losses should exactly cancel out. Table 5 sho w st h a ta v e r a g eg a i n sa r ep o s i t i v e ;h e n c e ,
overall eﬃciency gains are indicated in every row. Chart 2 shows the distribution of gains
i nt h ec a s eo fr o w2 .
If one contemplates reforms with a later vesting age, group (iii) should expand in
relative size. Thus, Table 5’s decline with vesting age in the average equivalent variation
is not surprising.
In sum, any of the variants of our proposed reform yield positive average equivalent
variations. On the other hand, by no means do all couples beneﬁt, and for some households
ex post losses are quite large in magnitude.
There is another factor worth considering: if a reform increases years of work, income
tax revenues will rise. The latter generates social gains – after all, households consume
the services of government whether they work or not. Table 5’s last column assesses
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 these social bonuses, measured on a per household basis exactly commensurate in units to
column 3. The social gains augment column 3’s personal gains by about 50 percent.
5. Conclusion
Recent proposals for U.S. Social Security reform have not addressed the potential
ineﬃciencies that the system creates. This paper oﬀers and analyzes an alternative, simple
reform aimed at alleviating the labor—supply distortions of the current program. After a
long vesting period (say, 35-40 years of contributions), the reformed policy would determine
a worker’s beneﬁts using the current formula for all prospective retirement dates; but after
the vesting period, the worker would no longer face the OASI payroll tax. For those who
continued to work after vesting, wages would, in partial equilibrium, increase 10.6 percent.
Lost revenues to the system would be made up by a small increase in the payroll tax during
the vesting period. In a life-cycle model where the only margin of choice in labor supply
is the timing of retirement, this reform eliminates the distortions of the Social Security
system for those whose optimal retirement occurs after the vesting period.
We evaluate the eﬀects of this reform in the context of a standard life—cycle model.
In contrast to prominent work in this vein, we estimate the parameters of our model using
integrated micro data and a novel estimation strategy. We ﬁnd that the proposed reform
could have substantial eﬀects on both behavior and welfare. Simulations of the model
indicate that retirement ages could rise by nearly a year on average, that a typical household
might willingly pay as much as $6,000 (1984 dollars) to participate in the reformed system,
and that additional gains accruing to society from extra income taxes due to longer careers
could average another $3000 per household. The total gains are not, however, Pareto
improvements: those who retire before the vesting period ends would transfer wealth to
those who retire later.
The heterogeneity in its welfare consequences suggests that, while simple and seem-
ingly plausible, the reform that this paper studies will not be unanimously embraced.
Nevertheless, the magnitudes of the estimated increase in average retirement age and wel-
fare suggest to us that the policy is worthy of further investigation.
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31Appendix I: Proofs
Lemma 1: Suppose that discontinuities in nit and labor supply at retirement make cri-
terion (3)-(4) and right—hand side of the asset equation discontinuous at ages tj.D e ﬁne
a present—value Hamiltonian with costate variable λ:
H ≡
 
e−ρ·t · u(cit)+λit · [r · ait + yit − cit], for t ∈ [S,R i),
e−ρ·t · v(cit)+λit · [r · ait − cit], for t ∈ [Ri ,T].
.
Then for a given Ri, the following conditions are necessary and suﬃcient for an optimum:
∂H
∂c
=0 all t, (i)




˙ ait = r · ait + yit − cit all t  = Ri , (iii)
aiS =0,a iRi+ = aiRi− + Bi(Ri) · er·Ri , and aiT =0. (iv)
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 : Let Ri be given. Begin with problem (4). Suppose it has one
breakpoint, t1 ∈ (Ri ,T). Solving the subproblem for t ≥ t1 – which is standard – we





e−ρ·t · u(cit,i,t,R i)dt + Φ(ait1 ,t 1)





(See, for example, Kamien and Schwartz [1981].) Since ait is continuous by nature, it only
remains to show that λit is continuous at t1. But, the envelope theorem shows
∂Φ(ait1 ,t 1)
∂a
= λit1+ . (vi)
Combining (v)-(vi) establishes continuity of the costate at t1. Induction on the number
of breakpoints, say, J , in (4) establishes continuity for any J . The logic of (v)-(vi), with
Φ(.)=ϕ(.), establishes continuity of the costate at t = Ri. The same arguments apply for
t<R i.
32Proof of Proposition 1: Suppose we have a solution of (3)-(4). Fix the Ri.T h eo p t i m a l
consumption path must solve (3)-(4) conditional on this Ri. Follow Lemma 1. From (ii),
˙ λit = −r · λit.T h e nf o rt ∈ (tj ,t j+1), we have
e−ρ·t · [nit]1−α·γ · [cit]α·γ−1 · [ it](1−α)·γ = λit from Lemma 1, (i)
⇐⇒ (α · γ − 1) ·
˙ cit
cit
= ρ − r, since t ∈ (tj ,t j+1)
establishing (5). For t = tj, j =1 ,...,J,L e m m a1s h o w sλit is continuous; so,
e−ρ·t · [nit−]1−α·γ · [cit−]α·γ−1 · [ it](1−α)·γ = λit =
e−ρ·t · [nit+]1−α·γ · [cit+]α·γ−1 · [ it](1−α)·γ , from Lemma 1, (i)
establishing (6). For t = Ri,b yt h es a m el o g i c ,s i n c e it+ =1 ,
e−ρ·t · [nit]1−α·γ · [cit−]α·γ−1 · [ it−](1−α)·γ = λit =
e−ρ·t · [nit]1−α·γ · [cit+]α·γ−1 , from Lemma 1, (i)
establishing (7). Integrating budget constraint (iii) from t = S to T gives (8).
Proof of Proposition 2: For any R = Ri,d e ﬁne a Hamiltonian as in Lemma 1. It can
serve for both (3) and (4). Lemma 1 shows
λiR =
∂ϕ(aiR + Bi(R) · er·R ,R )
∂a
. (vii)
Using (vii) and Kamien and Schwartz [1981],
∂ϕ(aiR + Bi(R) · er·R ,R )
∂R
=
λiR · [B 
i(R) · er·R + r · Bi(R) · er·R] − H(ciR+,a iR+,λiR,R). (viii)
As household i chooses R = Ri in (3), we have a “free endpoint problem.” Kamien
and Schwartz show that the necessary condition for an optimal R ∈ (S,T)i s
H(ciR−,a iR−,λiR,R)+
∂ϕ(aiR + Bi(R) · er·R ,R )
∂R
=0. (ix)
33Hence, for an optimal R ∈ (S,T), (viii)-(ix) imply
e−ρ·R · u(ciR)+λiR · [r · aiR− + yR− − ciR−]+
λiR · [B 
i(R) · er·R + r · Bi(R) · er·R]−
e−ρ·R · v(ciR) − λiR− · [r · aiR+ − ciR+]=0.
Recall that aiR+ = aiR− + Bi(R) · er·R. Hence, the preceding simpliﬁes to
e−ρ·R · u(ciR)+λiR · [yR− − ciR− + ciR+]+
λiR · [B 
i(R) · er·R] − e−ρ·R · v(ciR)=0. (x)
As (i), Lemma 1, shows that




condition (x) establishes (9).
Proof of Proposition 3: Fix R = Ri for the remainder of this proof. Set up Hamiltoni-
ans for, respectively, disability problem (12), retirement problem (4), and lifetime problem
with possible disability (13):
D ≡ e−ρ·t · v(¯ cit)=¯ Λit · [r · ¯ ait − ¯ cit],t ≥ D,
R ≡ e−ρ·t · v(cit)+Λit · [r · ait − cit],t ≥ R,
H ≡ P(t) · e−ρ·t · u(cit)+p(t) · ¯ ϕ(ait− + Xit,t,R)+
λit · [r · ait + yit − cit −
p(t) · Xit
P(t)
],t < R .
The costate variables are ¯ Λit, Λit,a n dλit, respectively.
Step 1. At demographic breakpoints, the analysis follows the proof of Proposition 1 ex-
actly.






= ΛiR , F.O.C. for (4)
34ΛiR =
∂ϕ(aiR + Bi(R) · er·R ,R )
∂aiR
, envelope theorem
λiR = P(R) ·
∂ϕ(aiR + Bi(R) · er·R ,R )
∂aiR
, F.O.C. for (13)
∂H
∂c
=0⇒ P(R) · e−ρ·R ·
∂u(ciR)
∂c
= λiR . F.O.C. for (13)
These four equations together establish (16).










∂ ¯ ϕ(aiD− + XiD ,D,R )
XiD
= λiD , F.O.C. for (13)
∂H
∂ciD
=0⇒ P(D) · e−ρ·D ·
∂u(ciD)
ciD






= ¯ ΛiD , F.O.C. for (12)
∂ ¯ ϕ(aiD− + XiD ,D,R )
XiD
= ¯ ΛiD . envelope theorem
These four equations together establish (17).
Step 4. The numerator of (18) is the expected present value of the household’s lifetime
earnings and retirement beneﬁts. (One could subtract disability—insurance premiums and
add expected disability—insurance beneﬁts, but they would exactly balance.) The denom-
inator times ciS is the expected present valueo fl i f e t i m ec o n s u m p t i o n .
35Proof of Proposition 4: Use the notation from the proof of Proposition 3. Analogous












− p(R) · ϕ(.)=0, (xi)
∂ϕ
 




ΛiR · [B 
i(R) · er·R + r · Bi(R) · er·R] − R
 








P(R) · ΛiR · [B 
i(R) · er·R + r · Bi(R) · er·R]−
P(R) ·
 





aiR− + Bi(R) · er·R ,R
 
=0. (xiii)
The proof of Proposition 3 shows
λiR = P(R) · ΛiR .
By construction,
¯ ϕ(aiR− + XiR ,R )=ϕ
 
aiR− + Bi(R) · er·R ,R
 
.
First—order conditions for (13) imply
P(R) · e−ρ·R · u (ciR)=λiR .
So, (xiii) simpliﬁes to





P(R) · e−ρ·R · [v(ciR+) − u(ciR−)], (xiv)
36which establishes (19).
Proposition 3 shows that term disability insurance for [t,t+ dt), where the interval
ends with retirement, should cover lost earnings, corrected for changing consumption needs
in the disabled state; hence,
p(R)
P(R)
· XiR dt =
p(R)
P(R)
· [yiR− − ciR− + ciR+]dt.
This completes the proof.
Appendix II: Adjustments of the CEX Data
W ed i v i d et h eN I P Aa n dC E Xd a t ai n t o1 1c a t e g o r i e s :f o o d ,a p p a r e l ,p e r s o n a lc a r e ,
shelter, household operation, transportation, medical care, recreation, education, personal
business, and miscellaneous. Detailed adjustments include the following.
(1) We subdivide “shelter” into “services from own house” and “other.” We scale the
latter as we do other categories, but we drop the CEX “services from own house” and
impute a substitute that allocates the annual NIPA total service ﬂow from residential
houses to the CEX in proportion to CEX reported house values.
(2) CEX medical expenditures omit employer contributions to health insurance and ser-
vices that Medicare covers. We annually, proportionately, and for every age adjust CEX
expenditures on private health insurance to match the Department of Health and Human
Services total for all premiums for private health insurance; and, we adjust out—of—pocket
health spending from the CEX to match annual DHHS totals.13 T u r n i n gt oM e d i c a r e ,
funding for the beneﬁts comes from a hospital insurance (HI) tax on wages and salaries,
monthly premiums for supplementary medical insurance (SMI) from people currently eli-
gible for beneﬁts, and contributions from general tax revenues to SMI. The CEX registers
only SMI premiums from participants; so, we allocate the yearly total of Medicare beneﬁts
(both HI and all SMI expenditure) to the CEX sample in proportion to SMI premium
payments (principally for people over 65).14
(3) The NIPA “personal business” category includes bank and brokerage fees, many of
which are hidden in the form of low interest on saving accounts, etc., and hence absent
from expenditures which CEX households perceive. We assume that bank and brokerage
fees make their way into the life—cycle model in the form of lower—than—otherwise interest
13 See http://www.cms.hhs.gov/statistics/burden-of-health-care-costs/table01.asp. The
annual ﬁgures cover 1987-2000. We extrapolate to 1984-86 and 2001 using the growth rate
of NIPA total medical consumption.
14 For HI expenditures, see Social Security Bulletin, Annual Statistical Supplement 2001,
table 8.A1; for SMI receipts and receipts from participant premiums, see table 8.A2.
37rates on saving; therefore, we normalize annual personal business expenditures measured
in the CEX to match the corresponding NIPA amount less bank and brokerage fees, and
omit bank and brokerage fees from our measure of consumption.
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